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JAMES F. BYRNES AND THE SUPREME
COURT*
1941-42
ROBERT McC. FIGG, JR.t
It may be said that Justice Byrnes began his preparation for
an amazing career of public and professional service, including
his service on the Supreme Court, when as a lad he "served a term
as office boy in an attorney's firm." At the age of fourteen he
worked for the late Benjamin Huger Rutledge of the Charleston
bar, who arranged a library membership, mapped out a course of
reading, and catechized him on what he had read.
Justice Byrnes said that this experience provided "a solid
background" for the study of the law in the office of Judge Robert
Aldrich in Aiken. It also provided the basic foundation for the
development of one of the nation's most incisive intellects and
articulate voices.
Years later, when great institutions of learning were honoring
his exceptional service as Secretary of State, Justice Byrnes
quipped that he was becoming "educated by degrees."
While reading law Justice Byrnes served as court stenogra-
pher, passed the bar examination, began practice and edited a
local newspaper at the same time, became the prosecuting attor-
ney of his circuit, and was elected to the Congress.
He served in the House of Representatives for seven terms.
A Woodrow Wilson liberal, the value of his service on the Com-
mittee on Appropriations was attested by the President himself.
This part of his career brought him into intimate association
during the First World War with Franklin D. Roosevelt, then
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
In the period from 1925 to 1931, he engaged intensively in the
general practice of the law in Spartanburg with the late Sam
Nichols and Cecil Wyche. There was no stronger or more active
law firm in the state than the firm of Nichols, Wyche & Byrnes.
He was in the United States Senate when Franklin D. Roos-
evelt became President, and he again became actively involved
* Address, Memorial Meeting of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C., December 18, 1972.
t Senior Counsel, Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope; Dean, U.S.C. School of Law,
1959-1970.
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in the legislative implementation of a chief executive's liberal
program.
Justice Byrnes served on the Supreme Court for the whole of
the 1941-1942 term. His commission was recorded October 6,
1941, two months before Pearl Harbor.
Although called upon many times by the President for con-
sultation and assistance, especially after the onset of the war, he
missed no sessions of the Court in hearings or caucuses, was late
only once, and authored his full share of the opinions filed for the
Court during the term.
Justice Byrnes delivered sixteen opinions for the Court; Jus-
tices Black and Frankfurter seventeen each; Justice Roberts
fifteen; Justice Murphy fourteen; and Justices Reed and Jackson
twelve each. Only Chief Justice Stone and Justice Douglas deliv-
ered more than their average share.
He wrote no separate concurring opinions. Very likely his
legislative experience in striving to achieve a consensus carried
over into his early judicial service.
Dissents were registered to six of his opinions for the Court,
three each by Justices Reed, Black, Douglas and Murphy, two by
Chief Justice Stone, and one each by Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter.
Justice Byrnes joined in dissenting opinions in twelve cases.
In so doing, he joined Chief Justice Stone six times, Justices
Black, Frankfurter and Douglas five times, Justice Roberts four
times, Justices Murphy and Jackson twice, and Justice Reed
once.
Four of the dissenting opinions in which he concurred were
written by Justice Douglas, three by Chief Justice Stone, two
each by Justices Black and Frankfurter, and one by Justice Rob-
erts.
In his judicial opinions, as in his other public statements, he
spoke with the power of brevity and the appropriate word, exem-
plifying Lord Bacon's aphorism that: "Reading maketh a full
man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man."
His skill in argument and effective exposition was brilliantly
illustrated by his opinion in United States v. Local 807,1 con-
curred in by seven other members of the Court, which held that
the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, designed to combat the pre-
1. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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datory gangs of the Kelly and Dillinger types, did not, as written,
show Congressional intention to include in its sweep militant
labor activity, however deplorable and unlawful under state law,
and by his dissenting opinion in the Wages and Hours case,
Walling v. A.H. Beto Corp. ,2 which became the opinion of the
Court when it won over Justice Jackson.' The Belo principle
which was thus laid down was adhered to by the Court upon
reconsideration some five years later.4
The variety of his cases included decisions upholding rights
under the 13th and 14th Amendments in criminal appeals; deal-
ing with claims of government priority in bankruptcies and re-
ceiverships; construing and applying Puerto Rico's statutes and
local laws; considering in a labor relations matter whether a strike
on shipboard away from the vessel's home port was a mutiny; and
determining that a consent decree in an anti-trust case was sub-
ject to modification later.
Justice Byrnes filed his first opinion for the Court in the case
of Edwards v. California,5 which may well have been the most
significant decision of the 1941-1942 term. A state statute was
held invalid under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution because it penalized the bringing or assisting to
bring into the state any indigent person knowing him to be indi-
gent. Edwards had brought his wife's unemployed and impecu-
nious brother from Arizona to California to live with them.
Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frank-
furter concurred in Justice Byrnes' opinion. The other Justices
preferred to predicate the holding on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6
Rejecting the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws, "that each
community should care for its own indigent, that relief is solely
the responsibility of local government," he wrote:
[I]n an industrial society the task of providing assistance
2. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
3. J. BYRNES, ALL IN ONE LiFETirIE 142 (1958).
4. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Drilling Co., 331 U.S. 17 (1947).
5. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
6. At the conference Byrnes approved the same view, but in writing the opinion he
relied on the commerce clause instead, in part because it would grant protection to non-
citizens lawfully in this country. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 578-
580 (1956). Cf. 42 CoLum. L. REv. 139, 141 (1942): "The question of aliens and their rights
is one in which prejudice runs strong, especially in wartime, and an unwarranted distinc-
tion on the basis of citizenship might well have unfortunate consequences."
1973]
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to the needy has ceased to be local in character. The duty to
share the burden, if not wholly to assume it, has been recognized
not only by State governments, but by the Federal government
as well. The changed attitude is reflected in the Social Security
laws under which the Federal and State governments co-operate
for the care of the aged, the blind and dependent children ....
It is reflected in the works programs under which work is fur-
nished the unemployed, with the States supplying approxi-
mately 25% and the Federal government approximatley 75% of
the cost . . . .It is further reflected in the Farm Security laws,
under which the entire cost of the relief provisions is borne by
the Federal government.7
It is not without significance that in the Senate Byrnes him-
self had studied the problems and worked in the forging of the
remedial legislation thus referred to. Like Justice Cardozo, his
stated belief was that the Constitution was framed upon the
theory "that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division."'
The Harvard Law Review noted the Edwards decision in
part:
In this case, the Court has reasserted the essential federal
nature of American government by destroying the barriers
which more than half the states had erected as protection
against the influx of depression migrants. . . .Although trans-
portation of persons has uniformly been held "commerce," the
Court in early decisions considered exclusionary measures
against the "moral pestilence of paupers" valid exercises of state
power. . . .Mr. Justice Byrnes, speaking for the majority, dis-
missed these decisions as inapplicable today because "Poverty
and immorality are not synonymous," and held that the na-
tional interest in free opportunity and mobility outweighs any
state interest in economic isolation.'
The Columbia Law Review observed:
It seems apparent that an adequate solution of the ills
caused by depression migration can be attained only by a fed-
eral program. By holding that the state legislation is an uncon-
stitutional interference with interstate commerce, the Court
7. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1942).
8. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
9. 55 HARV. L. Rv. 873, 874 (1942).
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places the problem within the scope of Congressional
regulation ....
The decision is also noteworthy in that a majority, by hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional without specifically relying on
a test of actual discrimination, implicitly rejects the position
...that in the absence of actual discrimination relief must be
obtained from Congress. This suggests that a majority of the
Court, including the recently appointed Justices Byrnes and
Jackson, view the Commerce Clause as a real limitation of state
power, it being a function of the Court to apply this limitation
to safeguard interstate commerce.'0
Edwards v. California came less than ten months after Chief
Justice Stone's landmark decision in United States v. Darby," in
which the Court began the process of returning the commerce
power to the position accorded to it in Gibbons v. Ogden over a
century earlier.'2 Edwards reaffirmed the principle that the Com-
merce Clause alone, without affirmative action by Congress, in-
terdicted state interference with interstate intercourse in respect
to a matter of national concern requiring regulation by a single
authority. Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart3 and its hob-
bling limitation on Congressional power; Edwards overruled City
of New York v. Miln.4
In these cases, and Chief Justice Stone's comprehensive syn-
thesis in 1945 of the controlling cases in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona,'" the national government was again recognized by the
Court to possess the power over commerce among the several
states which is essential to make the federal system work as the
Framers intended that it should.
Twenty-five years later eight members of the Court in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States held the provisions of the
1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on account of
race in public accommodations offered to interstate travelers to
be valid by reason of the commerce power.',
Not long after the adjournment of the 1941-42 term of the
Court, President Roosevelt, heavily burdened by the crushing
10. 42 COLUM. L. REV. 139, 141-142 (1942).
11. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
14. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
15. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
16. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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responsibilities of the war, called upon his old friend and long-
time co-worker to assume "a position of highest importance to the
carrying out of the war." In answering the call, Justice Byrnes
did not agree that he could remain on the Court while discharging
functions of the executive branch of the government. He believed
strongly that the principle of separation of powers is probably the
most important guaranty of the liberties of the people, 7 that
"there is no liberty. . . if the judiciary be not separated from the
legislative and executive,"'" because, as Woodrow Wilson put it,
a constitutional government "keeps its promises, or does not keep
them, in its courts."' 9
Rarely has a Justice come to the Supreme Court with as
favorable background of training and experience as Justice
Byrnes possessed. Both as a court stenographer, a prosecuting
attorney and an able advocate in the general practice of the law,
he was at home in the workings of the machinery of justice. Both
as a Congressman and a Senator, he had an innate understanding
of the workings of the federal system and the respective responsi-
bilities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the
national government. His service in the Senate in the years of the
great depression which so vastly affected the whole future of the
nation, in which period he played a leading part in the enactment
of measures devised to meet the depression's devastating effect,
gave him an extraordinary insight into the judicial issues which
would characterize the years ahead.
Although Justice Byrnes went on to render outstanding ad-
ministrative and diplomatic service to the nation after leaving the
Court, I think it proper to say that by his resignation the Court
and the nation were deprived of a judicial career which already
had the promise of greatness.
17. "It was . . . looked to as a bulwark against tyranny." United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 443 (1964).
18. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, XI, vi (1748).
19. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1908).
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